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The performance of cross-border acquisitions in emerging and developed markets
Landry Ahouansou
We examine the impact of cross-border mergers in emerging and developed
markets on shareholders wealth between 1988 and 2008. In addition to the acquiror gains
that have been discussed by number of prior researches, we also looked at the target and
combined returns in order to present a more complete picture. Our results confirm that
developed market acquirors gain on average 1.56% more when they acquire emerging
market targets as compared to when they acquire targets in developed markets. We also
find that emerging market targets' shareholder values are not maximized when acquired
by developed market acquirors. Furthermore, we observe that no matter the acquiror's
origin, developed market targets experience greater average cumulative abnormal returns
than emerging market targets. We conjecture that at least a part of the positive acquiror
returns cannot be attributed to the transfer of superior governance practices or intangibles
as suggested by Chari, Ouimèt and Tesar (2010). Moreover, our results indicate that the
sophistication level of the acquiror and the target as well as their relative bargaining
ability might be important determinants of the sharing of gains.
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1. Introduction
The number and value of cross-border mergers have grown steadily and at last
count appears to greatly exceed the comparable numbers for purely U.S. mergers. They
also constitute an increasing fraction of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in emerging
markets. Black (2000) notes that U.S. only merger activity is only about 40% of the
worldwide total by value and 30% of the total by the number of transactions. Similarly,
Evenett (2003) notes the sharp acceleration in cross-border merger activity during the
decade of the 1990s and notes the growing importance of cross-border mergers as a
vehicle of FDI. Several recent studies have helped us better understand this increasingly
important phenomenon1. However, they almost universally focus on the role of
governance in the transfer and addition of value to acquirors and targets involved. As a
result, it remains unclear if there are other as yet undiscovered factors that remain
important determinants of shareholder value for acquiror and target firms. In addition, to
our knowledge, there are no studies at this point that provide a detailed comparison of the
effects of cross-border mergers on the wealth of different groups of acquiror and target
shareholders.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the wealth effects of cross-
border mergers. Our inclusion of target and combined returns along with acquiror returns
allow us to present a more complete picture than that provided by prior studies. For ease
of exposition, we divide our sample into four groups based on the country where the
acquiror and the target are headquartered. In particular, we refer to our subsample where
1 See, for example, Starks and Wei (2004), Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), Bris and Cabolis (2008),Kuipèrs, Miller, and Patel (2009) and Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010).
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the acquiror is from a developed market and the target from an emerging market as the
DM-EM sample. Following a similar nomenclature, we define the DM-DM, EM-DM,
and EM-EM samples.2 We find that acquirors in the DM-EM sample gain 1.56% more
than acquirors in the DM-DM sample. This finding only partially confirms the transfer of
governance hypothesis developed by Chari et al. (2010) because we also find that
emerging market targets lose when acquired by developed market acquirors. In addition,
we find that no matter where the acquiror is from, developed market targets always make
more money than emerging market targets. Finally, we confirm that cross-border mergers
are greater source of synergy when both the target and the acquiror are from dissimilar
markets. In other words EM-DM and DM-EM transactions create greater value than EM-
EM and DM-DM transactions. We conjecture that at least a part of the positive acquiror
returns found by Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) cannot be attributed to the transfer of
superior governance practices or intangibles. We further test for the relation between
acquiror and target returns and find a significant and negative relation when the acquiror
is from a developed market and the target from an emerging market. The significant and
negative relation does not hold when both the target and the acquiror are from markets at
a similar level of development (i.e. either both firms are from developed markets or both
firms are from emerging markets). Our results indicate that the sophistication of the
acquiror and the target is an important determinant of the sharing of gains and their
relative bargaining ability is an important determinant of cross-border merger returns.
Our results provide a fresh perspective on cross-border mergers and highlight the
2 Thus we refer to the subsample where the acquiror and target are from developed markets as the DM-DM
sample, where the acquiror is from an emerging market but the target is from a developed market as the
EM-DM sample, and where both the acquiror and the target are from an emerging market as the EM-EM
sample.
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importance of the sharing of gains in determining the wealth of acquiror and target
shareholders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior work and
our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 and section 5 describe our
methodology and present the main results. Finally, section 6 concludes. In addition,
section 6 presents the limitations of this paper and suggests eventual directions for further
research on this arising topic.
2. Prior work and hypotheses
There is an exhaustive literature that has examined the impact of domestic
mergers and acquisitions on the wealth of acquiror and target shareholders and many of
them have analyzed the wealth effects of such deals.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that corporate takeovers generate positive gains,
that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders do not lose.
However, they also find that the gains created by corporate takeovers do not appear to
come from the creation of market power. Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1990) look at
corporate takeovers in the 1980's and confirm the basic conclusions of Jensen and
Ruback (1983). They find that larger premiums are paid to target shareholders for later
tender offers than for earlier tender offers. They also find that acquirors receive at best
modest increases in their stock price, and suffer stock-price declines as often as they do
gains. They however provide evidence that premiums in takeovers represent real wealth
3 We discuss only a small part of this literature. In addition to Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarell,
Brickley and Netter (1990) this literature is surveyed by Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001).
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gains and are not simply wealth redistributions as hypothesize by Jensen and Ruback
(1983).
There are several studies that have looked at the changes in corporate governance
associated with mergers. For example, Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) looked at corporate
governance changes in the 1980's and 1990's and found that many of the changes
occurred due to deregulation and capital market forces. Many managers at the time had
become entrenched in their methods and were no longer operating their firms near their
maximum potential. This led to the rise of leveraged buyouts and corporate takeovers in
order to increase both firm and shareholder value. They found that capital markets aided
in changing corporate governance practices by permitting poorly managed firms to be
taken over as well as punishing the value of firms where poor corporate governance was
the norm. The 1980's and 1990's ushered in an era where markets rewarded good
corporate governance.
However, there are relatively fewer studies that examine the changes in corporate
governance in cross-border mergers. Bris and Cabolis (2008) look at 506 cross-borders
mergers and acquisitions between 1989 and 2002. They find that acquisitions of firms in
weaker shareholder protection countries by firms in stronger protective regimes results in
a higher premium, relative to similar target in a domestic acquisition. In other words, the
higher the transfer of governance, the higher the acquiror gain.
Kuiper Miller and Patel (2009) examine the cumulative abnormal returns to U.S.
targets, their foreign acquirors, and the target-acquiror portfolio in 181 successful cross-
border tender offers during the period 1982-1991. They find that the incentive
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mechanisms created by the degree of shareholder-creditor rights protection and legal
enforcement in the acquiring firm country can explain the observed variation in target,
acquiror, and portfolio returns.
Moeller and Schlingemann (2004) examined mergers and acquisitions between
US bidders and both domestic and foreign targets between 1985 and 1995. Interestingly,
their results indicated that firms who performed mergers within the US fared better in
terms of year end operating results as well as stock performance. This result thus
indicates that international diversification does not create lead to highest shareholder
value. In terms of international mergers, the authors were able to conclude that legal
systems which promoted shareholder rights as well as the level of merger activity were
strongly positively correlated with the bidder's ultimate returns.
Starks and Wei (2004) look at cross-border mergers with U.S. target firms over
the 1980-1998 period. They find that takeover premiums are decreasing in the quality of
the foreign bidding firm's home country governance for deals completed with stock.
Their result suggests that foreign acquirors compensate target firm shareholders for the
resulting exposure to inferior corporate governance regimes. This implies that the sharing
of gains between acquirors and targets could be an important determinant of the wealth
effects of such transactions. They find that the acquiring firm stockholders' abnormal
returns are increasing in the quality of the home country corporate governance.
Our paper is most closely related to the work of Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010)
who analyze a sample of cross border mergers from the perspective of developed market
acquirors. They find that the acquisition of emerging market targets by bidders from
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developed markets results in a mean abnormal return of over 1.16% to the acquiror. This
is in contrast to the insignificant or negative abnormal returns that they report for
domestic acquisitions. They explain this anomalous return by governance transfer and
intangible assets transfer. However, their analysis is confined to the acquirors and does
not include target returns. As a result, it is still not clear if the higher returns of the
acquiror are a result of greater total value creation or a skewed sharing of the gains from
the merger whereby the acquiror gains at the expense of the target.
3. Data
3.1 Mergers and Acquisitions
3.1.1 Sample Selection
We use Thomson Reuters Security Data Corporation's (SDC) Platinum Mergers
and Corporate Transactions database to collect data on 637514 private and public,
domestic and cross-border acquisitions announced between 1988 and 2008. SDC collates
information from over 200 English and foreign language news sources, SEC filings and
the filings from its international counterparts, trade publications, news wire reports, and
proprietary surveys of investment banks, law firms, and other advisory firms. For each
transaction, the SDC database provides the date on which the transaction was first
announced and the date on which the transaction became effective, as well as some
characteristics of the target and acquiring firms including: name, nation, industry sector,
primary North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), SEDOL number and
the amount - over the last twelve months before the announcement date - of intangible
assets, cash and marketable securities, common equity, net income, earnings before
interests and taxes (EBIT), total assets, net sales, market capitalization, total liabilities
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and capital expenditure. The database also includes transaction-specific information on
percentage of shares acquired, the percentage of shares owned before and after the
transaction is completed, the percentage of shares sought by the acquiring firm, the
method of payment and the deal status; whether or not the deal is completed.
Following Betton and Eckbo (2000) we group all the successive bids for the same
target into a takeover contest. According to Betton and Eckbo (2000), a contest is
initiated by a control bid if there are no other public control bids for the same target over
the preceding six months. All subsequent control bids within six months of a previous bid
belong to the same contest. The contest ends when there are no additional control bids for
the same target over the following six-month period. In our study, the above mentioned
definition of contest has been extended to allow a contest to begin with a non-for-control
bid and also to include all private bids. The total number of contests obtained is 589 026.
For each of them, we only keep the first bidder which is the one that initiated the contest.
The rationale behind this choice is that, in contests where there is more than one bidder, it
is impossible to dissociate the abnormal return on the target share price that comes from
the first bid to the abnormal return that comes from the second, third or fourth bid.
We then narrow down the sample to the deals that were completed. Out of the
remaining 436 533 deals, we keep the takeovers that are motivated by "taking control of
the target". A deal is defined as a "for-control-deal" if the percentage of shares owns by
the acquiror before the announcement date plus the percentage of shares sought is greater
or equal to fifty one percent. As noted by Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010), transactions
that are for control appear to drive the positive returns to developed market acquirors of
emerging market targets while the transactions that are not for control do not appear to
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have a significant effect. As a result, these transactions are potentially more interesting to
us as we seek to uncover the wealth effects that could arise from cross-border mergers.
Out of the remaining 338 570 deals, we retain the 1 1 618 involving a public target and a
public acquiror in order to have access to the daily stock prices of both the acquiror and
the target. This criterion has also been used by Kiymaz and Mukheriee (2000) and
Lowinski, Schiereck and Thomas (2004). In addition, Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller
(2002) found that bidder shareholders gain when buying a private firm or subsidiary but
lose when purchasing a public firm. Therefore, we would not want to examine a sample
that includes both public and private firms for evidence of sources of synergy.
Finally, we delete 4054 deals that include a financial firm - all SIC codes from
6000 to 6999- or a utility - all SIC codes from 4900 to 4949-. The remaining 7435
transactions are classified into the DM-DM, DM-EM, EM-EM, and EM-DM sample.
To determine whether a country is a developed, an emerging, or a frontier market,
we followed the market definition and the country classification of two well established
indices designed to measure the equity market performance of developed, emerging and
frontier markets: the MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) and the MSCI Frontier
Markets (FM) Index4. Both indices are free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted
and held by Morgan Stanley Capital International. The Morgan Stanley's country
4 The FTSE Global Equity Index Series and the MSCI All Country World Index have been compared
together in order to make sure that choosing the MSCI country list does not entail a significantly special
assumption that will drive the results toward a different way. In 2009, both indices had approximately the
same definition of emerging, developed and frontier markets except that MSCI ACWI included the
sustainability of the economic development in their selection criteria. This leads to some minor differences
in country classification. We selected MSCI ACWI because it is the one that had data available over our
sample period, published all the changes in country classification and made the distinction between
emerging and frontier since 1997.
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Classification is based on three criteria: the sustainability of the economic development of
each country, the size and the liquidity of their equity market and finally, their market
accessibility.
As of June 2009 the MSCI ACWI consisted of 45 country indices comprising 23
developed and 22 emerging market country indices and the MSCI FM consisted of 25
frontier market country indices.
The developed market country indices included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States.
The emerging market country indices included are: Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand,
and Turkey.
The frontier market country indices included are: Argentina, Bahrain, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Estonia, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Mauritius,
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Trinidad
& Tobago, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam.
From the list above, we exclude all countries that are classified as tax havens by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as of June 2009
like Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, and Jersey.
DM-DM, DM-EM, EM-EM and EM-DM respectively includes 6729, 208, 405 and 93
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transactions. Finally, following Chari et al. (2010), we restrict the DM-DM sample to the
223 transactions where the acquiror has at least once, made an acquisition in an emerging
market.
3.1.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 present the structure of our four analyzed sample by
country, by year and by industrial classification respectively.
From Table 2 Panel A it appears that the DM-DM sample is driven by U. S and
U.K firms. Together, they represent about 52% of the acquirors and 70% of the targets.
This sample concentration is probably to the fact that we restricted our developed market
acquirors to firms that have at least once, between 1988 and 1998, made an acquisition in
an emerging market country. Indeed, and as shown by Panel B, almost 50% of the
acquirors in the DM-EM sample are from the United States or the United Kingdom.
Regarding the targets in the DM-EM sample, Panel B shows that during our sample
period, developed market firms shopped in 24 different emerging market countries. The
three most attractive targets are South Africa (11.54%), Brazil (11.06%) and India
(1 1.06%). Similar patterns are replicated in the EM-EM and EM-DM samples; acquirors
and targets in EM-EM and acquirors in EM-DM are from various countries but almost
30% of them are from South Africa, Brazil, India and South Korea. Regarding developed
market targets in EM-DM, 47.31% of them are U.S firms.
Table 3 provides the repartition of the total number of transactions in each sample
by year. By doing so, we confirm that our results are not specific to any particular and are
representative of the whole sample period. Panel A, B, C and D confirm that the total
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number of deals is fairly distributed among every year for DM-DM, DM-EM, EM-EM
and EM-DM respectively.
In addition, Table 4 indicates that most of the mergers and acquisitions in our four
samples happen between an acquiror and a target from the same industry. Even cross-
market mergers and acquisitions (DM-EM and EM-DM) do not reflect industry
diversification. We also observe that cross-markets mergers mostly occur in the
manufacturing, the mining and the services industries.
Finally Table 5 provides the mean, the median, the minimum and the maximum
of the level of market capitalization, total assets, intangible assets, total cash and total
liabilities for acquirors and targets in each of our four samples.
3.2 Daily stock returns
Daily opening and closing stock prices are collected from Bloomberg from
January 1st 1988 to December 31st 2008 for all the acquirors and targets in our four
subsamples. The prices are in local currency and are adjusted to reflect capital changes
like spin-offs, stock splits and/or consolidations, stock dividends and/or bonus and rights
offerings and/or entitlement. We used the SEDOL number collected from SDC as the
identifier for each acquiror and target in Bloomberg. The daily stock returns are
calculated as following:
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where Rit is the return of a given firm i on a trading day t. Closeit is the adjusted closing
price of stock i on day f. and Closei t_x is the adjusted closing price of i on the trading
day before day t .
3.3 Market Benchmarks
In this study, the choice of a benchmark for each country's stock market is of a
high importance because each nation index has to represent the performance of the stock
market of the given nation and by proxy, reflect investor sentiment on the state of its
economy. In other words, the choice of a good stock market benchmark will help in
making accurate predictions of the stock returns of the company in the nation as
described in the event study section which will in turn result in a more precise calculation
of the abnormal returns.
To be consistent with the literature, we used the broadest market-capitalization-weighted
index available for each country in our subsamples as a default option. Since free-float
indices are calculated by using the number of shares readily available in the market -
locked-in shares such as those held by promoters and governments are excluded - instead
of using all of the shares outstanding, they provide a more accurate reflection of market
movements. Therefore, when available, we substituted the free-float-market
capitalization index to the full-market capitalization index. Also, in order to be selected
as a nation's benchmark, a given index has to be calculated in the local currency and have
daily opening and closing prices - adjusted to reflect capital changes like spin-offs, stock
splits and/or consolidations, stock dividends and/or bonus and rights offerings and/or
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entitlement - recorded on Bloomberg from January 1st, 1988 to December 31st, 2008.
Finally, for emerging and frontier markets, we required the index to include a portion of
the most actively traded stocks in the specific country.
With all the filters in place, we manually checked all the indexes listed by country on
Bloomberg and selected the most appropriate one for each nation in our sample based the
above mentioned criteria. Table 6 presents the list of the countries covered by this study
along with the benchmark selected for each of them. The daily market returns are
calculated as following.
_ Closemt-Closem t-i ,?\
Kmt~ Closent K '
where Rmt is the return of a given index m on a trading day t. Closemt is the adjusted
closing price of index m on day t and CIoSen^1 is the adjusted closing price of m on
the trading day before day t .
3.4 Exchange Rates
We use the Pacific Exchange Rate Service5 to collect daily currency exchange
rates in order to convert all the stock returns and market returns from their local
currencies to U.S. Dollar (USD).
5 http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/. The Pacific Exchange Rate Service is a free database supported by the Sauder
School of Business at the University of British Columbia and designed as a repository of historical
exchange rates for the academic community, i.e., economists and other researchers.
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4. Market Reactions to Announcements in Emerging and Developed Markets
In the first part of this study, we follow the event study methodology used by
Schwert (1996) to estimate the cumulative abnormal return for all the acquirors and
targets in our four samples. We calculate the market model regression [eq.(3)] for the 253
trading days (about one year) ending 127 trading days (about six months) before the first
public announcement (day t = 0) of a merger or acquisition:
Rit = ai + ßiRmt + eit, t = -379 -127, (3)
where Rit is the daily return on the stock of acquiror (or target) firm /; Rmt is the daily
return on day t of the index selected as benchmark for the stock market activity in the
country of firm i. Note that we replaced the continuously compounded returns used by
Schwert (1996) by the daily returns. % is assumed to be a normally, identically
distributed, serially uncorrelated zero mean disturbance term. We only include acquirors
or targets that have at least 100 daily returns available to estimate the parameters of (1) in
order to have the best possible market model estimation. Finally, we use the estimates
from (1) to estimate the abnormal returns, £it, on the announcement date. Since our
samples cover countries with different level of market efficiency, we also estimate the
cumulative abnormal return for the 21-, 11- and 3-day period centered on the
announcement date, as well as the cumulative abnormal returns for (0, +1) for every
acquiror and target in each of our four samples. All the abnormal returns are estimated in
local currency - in order to reflect the reaction of local investors - and in U.S. dollar
(USD) - in order to make all the cumulative abnormal returns comparable across
samples-. We then calculate the market capitalization weighted joint returns in USD.
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Since frequent acquirors in the sample period indicate a high chance of other acquisition
announcements in the estimation periods, and any abnormal returns influenced by these
announcements will bias our parameters estimates, we wanted to re-estimate the
abnormal returns of our acquirors and targets using a different methodology. Like
Bouwman et al. (2009) and Dong et al. (2006), we use the modified market model
initially proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) to estimate abnormal returns. The
abnormal return for a firm is measured by removing the value-weighted market returns
from the firm's return:
ARit=Ri, -Rm1 (4)
where Rit is firm Ts daily stock return on date t and Rmt is the daily return on day t of
the index selected as benchmark for the stock market activity in the country of firm i on
date t. The market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns are estimated for the
announcement date, the 21-, 11- and 3-day period centered on the announcement date,
and the (0, +1) event window. Once again, both the local currency and the USD
cumulative abnormal returns are estimated. We also calculate the market capitalization
weighted joint returns in USD.
For both the market model and the market adjusted returns method, we use a
Student t-test (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) to evaluate whether or not the mean (median)
of the estimated market reactions - acquirors and targets - are significantly different from
zero in each of our samples.
Table 7 presents the cumulative abnormal stock market reactions - in local
currency and in USD - to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions transactions in
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the DM-DM, DM-EM, EM-EM and the EM-DM sample using the market model. For
each window, Table 7 presents the mean and the median CARs along with the p-value of
the student t-test of the mean and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the median in
parentheses. Table 8 presents the results obtained using the market-adjusted returns
model. In our sample, there is no evidence that the CARs in USD significantly differ
from the CARs calculated in local currency; the CARs in local currency are really close
to the CARs in USD. This is verified for every window in every sample for both the
market model and the market adjusted return model. There is also no evidence that CARs
estimated with the market model significantly differ from the CARs estimated with the
market-adjusted returns model. Finally, the sign of the CARs and the strength of the
results are consistent over the different event windows used. Therefore, in order to
lighten the text and unless further notice, the upcoming discussion on the findings will be
based on the CARs estimated in USD, with the market model, and for the announcement
date and the three day period centered on the announcement date.
Table 7 Panel A presents the results for the DM-DM sample. On average,
between 1988 and 2008, the developed market acquirors - that have at least once made an
acquisition in an emerging market during the same period of time experienced a non-
significant negative gain when they acquired a developed market target. The CARs are -
0.23% on the event date and -0.31% for the (-1, +1) event window. On the other hand,
developed market targets realised a positive and highly significant large gain; 20.38% on
the announcement date and 23.64% for the three day period centered on the event date.
Overall, the DM-DM transactions during the sample period turn out to a little value
destruction as shown by the combined gains; a non-significant -0.31% for day 0.
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Panel B of the same table focus on the stylized facts of the DM-EM sample and
reports a cumulative abnormal return of 1.25% for developed market bidders that
acquired targets in an emerging market. It also appears that on average, the cumulative
abnormal returns for emerging markets targets bought by developed market acquirors are
significantly positive; 2.26% on the announcement date. This abnormal return is even
higher when we consider a wider event window; we report a cumulative abnormal return
to the target stock price of 10.94% for the 10-day period centered on the announcement
day. In our attempt to explain this difference, we turn to the weak market efficiency of
the emerging markets. Overall, DM-EM transactions seem to result in a synergy. Even if
the long term event windows do not provide significant results, we notice a 1.51%
cumulative abnormal return on the announcement day. To our knowledge, Chari et al.
(2010) is the only one paper that looked at takeovers between developed market acquirors
and emerging market targets. Note however that they only looked at the acquiror's gain.
Our results are in line with theirs; they reported a cumulative abnormal return to
acquiror's stock price of 1.16% for a 3-day period centered on the announcement date.
Table 7 Panel C presents strong evidence that, in the EM-EM sample, takeover
transactions are profitable for both the acquiror and the target. The cumulative abnormal
return of the acquiror is 1.69% on the announcement day. From the target point of view,
the gain is around 2.55% on the announcement day and 6.63% for the 10-day period
centered on the announcement day. Both of the acquiror and the target gains are
significant at the 1% level. Remark however that the target abnormal return is relatively
small compared to the one we are used to see in DM-DM deals. Finally, Panel C also
shows weak evidence that takeover transaction involving an emerging market target and
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an emerging market acquiror overall result in a little positive gain. For example, the
market capitalization weighted joint abnormal return on the announcement date is 0.73%
but not significant. However, the abnormal return for (-1+1) is 2.84% significant at the
5% level of significance and the abnormal return for (0+1) is 2.00% significant at the
10% level of significance.
Finally, Panel D exhibits the patterns of the acquiror, the target and the joint
returns in the EM-DM sample. Nothing significant seems to happen on the acquiror's
side; we report a negative return of 0.30%. Conversely, there is strong evidence that
developed market targets acquired by emerging market acquirors experienced a positive
gain. For example, the target's abnormal return on the announcement date is of 12.62%.
Overall it appears that EM-DM transaction create synergy; the market capitalization
weighted joint returns is 18.08% on the announcement date. This anomalous return is
even bigger, 26.37%, when we consider the 10-day period centered on the announcement
date.
Now that we have a big picture on the outcome of mergers and acquisitions in
each of our four samples, we pursue the analysis by highlighting the differences between
acquirors - as well as targets and joint returns - across samples. We use a Student t-test
(Wilcoxon ranked sign test) to estimate whether or not the difference in the mean
(median) between any given two samples is significantly different from zero. We perform
this test on the announcement date as well as on the 10-period centered on the
announcement date in order to control for any possible effect of weak market efficiency.
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Table 9 Panel A summarizes the differences in market reaction of the acquirors. It
shows that acquirors in the DM-EM sample gain 1.56% more than acquirors in the DM-
DM sample. This difference confirms our previous results. Note however that there is no
significant evidence that the acquiror gains in the DM-EM sample are greater than the
acquiror gains in the EM-EM sample.
The differences in target reaction to merger announcement are reported in Table 9
Panel B. When comparing DM-DM to EM-EM it appears that on average, on the
announcement day, developed market targets acquired by a developed market acquirors
earn about 16.71% more than emerging market targets acquired by emerging market
acquirors. According to Chari et al. (2010), DM-EM takeovers on average result in a
transfer of superior governance practices or intangibles. If this hypothesis is true and
assuming that everything else being equal, we expect a positive gain to both the target
and the acquiror. Therefore, the difference in gain between the targets of DM-EM and
EM-EM should be less than 16.71%. Unfortunately, Panel B shows that this difference is
18%. In other words, emerging market targets are not better off when acquired by
developed market acquirors. This result is confirmed by the comparison of EM-EM and
DM-EM. Panel B reports that emerging market targets acquired by emerging markets
acquirors realise 1.28% - statistically non-significant - more than emerging market targets
acquired by developed market acquirors. We conclude that either the transfer of superior
governance practices or intangibles hypothesis does not hold or there is something else
happening at the same time and resulting in value destruction for emerging market targets
in the DM-EM sample.
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Panel B also shows that no matter where the acquiror is from, developed market
targets always make more money than an emerging market target. For example targets
in the EM-DM sample make 14.29% more than targets in the EM-EM sample. Even
when considering cross-markets mergers, targets in the EM-DM sample make 15.57%
more than targets in the DM-EM sample.
Finally, Panel C summarizes the differences in the market-capitalization joint
returns between our four samples. We observe that cross-market mergers generally
generate more synergy than mergers where both the target and the acquiror are from
markets at a similar level of development. For example, DM-EM deals generate 1.82%
more than DM-DM. Also, EM-DM deals generate 18.40% more than DM-DM and
'17.38% more than EM-EM deals. Remark that there is no evidence that DM-EM
transactions are more profitable than EM-EM transactions.
In summary, we find that acquirors in the DM-EM sample gain 1.56% more than
acquirors in the DM-DM sample. This finding only partially confirms the transfer of
governance hypothesis because we also find that emerging market targets lose when
acquired by developed market acquirors. In addition, we find that no matter where the
acquiror is from, developed market targets always make more money than emerging
market targets. We finally confirm that cross-border mergers are greater source of
synergy than mergers where both the target and the acquiror are from the same markets.
6 We only provide two examples but all the possible combinations in Table 9 Panel B confirm that no
matter where the acquiror is from, developed market targets make more gain than emerging market targets.
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5. Determinants of acquiror's gain
The second part of this research sheds some light on the determinants of the
stylized facts found in the previous section. We use ordinary least square regressions
(OLS) to provide evidence that (1) developed market acquiror make money at the
expense of their emerging market target. This is also the case for developed market target
that experience a gain at the expense of their emerging market acquiror. (2) Transfer of
governance is not the only onp source of gain for developed markets that buy emerging
market targets, [eq. (6)] explores the relation between acquiror and target's winsorized
cumulative abnormal returns for the 3-day period centered on the merger date in our four
samples:
Acquiror's CAR1 =a¡+ftx Target's CAR1 + Control variables + S1 (6)
We control for the asymmetries in institutional settings by using the legal and
institutional measures suggested by La Porta et al. (1998) in order to confirm that the
relation between the acquiror and the target's abnormal return holds even in presence of
transfer of governance. The control variables are: "rule of law", "efficiency of judiciary
system", "corruption", "risk of expropriation", "risk of contract repudiation" and are
defined in Appendix A. Following Chari et al. (2010) we estimate the asymmetries in
institutional setting using the difference between the acquiror and target country scores
for each variable. For example, Switzerland scores 9.98 for the risk of contract
repudiation, while Philippines scores 5.22 along the same institutional quality dimension.
The transfer of governance will therefore be 4.76.
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Table 10 reports the results of [eq. (6)] for the four samples of interest. Model (1)
is the relation between the CARs of the acquiror and the CARs of the corresponding
target for (-1, +1). Model (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) control for the asymmetries in "rule of
law", "efficiency of judiciary system", "corruption", "risk of expropriation" and "risk of
contract repudiation" respectively. Panel A (DM-DM) and Panel C (EM-EM) show a
positive relation between the acquiror's abnormal return and the target's abnormal return.
Even if the relation is not statistically significant for the DM-DM sample, it appears that
the positive sign of the coefficient is consistent no matter if there is a transfer of
governance or not. On the other hand, Panel B (DM-EM) and Panel D (EM-DM) show a
negative relation between the acquiror's abnormal return and the target's abnormal
return. Once again, the relation is not statistically significant in the DM-EM sample but
the coefficient always shows' a negative relation even when we control for the
asymmetries in institutional environment. In other words, except the non-statistical
significance for DM-DM and DM-EM, deals between acquiror and target from the same
market seem to results in a synergy. Conversely, in cross-market mergers, the developed
market firm seem to gain at the expenses of the emerging market firm as shown by the
negative sign of the coefficient.
So as to make sure that the weak relation obtained in DM-DM and DM-EM is not
the result of a small sample size - or any other reason not related to the relation between
the acquiror and the target abnormal returns -, we re-estimate [eq. (6)] with two new
samples. The first sample includes all the deals that involve an acquiror and a target from
the same market (DM-DM and EM-EM). The second sample includes all the cross-
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market mergers and acquisitions (DM-EM and EM-DM). By doing so, we also confirm
whether the relation found in the EM-EM and the EM-DM samples are robust or not.
Table 1 1 presents the new estimation of the relation between the acquiror and the
target's abnormal return in our two new samples. Models (1) - (6) remain as defined
previously. From Panel A it appears that, for mergers involving an acquiror and a target
in a same market between 1988 and 2008, an increase in 1% of the target's abnormal
return, results in an increase of 0.037% in the acquiror's abnormal return. This relation is
significant at the 10% level but becomes even stronger when we control for the transfer
of governance. On the other hand, Panel B confirms our previous findings. In cross-
markets mergers and acquisitions over our sample period, the acquiror's gain is
negatively related to the target's gain. An increase of 1% in the target's abnormal return
results in a decrease of about 0.069% in the acquiror's abnormal return. This relation
remains statistically significant when we control for the asymmetries in institutional
settings.
Additionally we maximize the cross-sectional variance by combining the four
samples and we look at the statistical difference between the negative relation found in
cross-market acquisitions and the positive relation shown by acquisitions involving
acquirors and targets in the same market, [eq. (7)] and [eq. (8)] investigate this
difference:
ACAR = a + (ß?? TCAR ) + [ß2(TCAR x dummy)] + Control variables (7)
ACAR = a + P1(TCAR ) + [ß2(TCAR x dummy)] + ß3 dummy + Control variables (8)
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where ACAR is the acquiror's cumulative abnormal return for (-1, +1), TCAR is the
target's cumulative abnormal return for (-1, +1) and dummy is a dummy variable which
equals 1 the transaction is a cross-market acquisition and 0 otherwise. TCVU? X dummy
is the interaction between the target's cumulative abnormal return and the dummy
variable. The control variables are the same proxies for asymmetries in institutional
settings between the acquiror nation and the target nation. Note that [eq. (7)] only
includes the interaction between the dummy variable and the target's CAR in its
explanatory variables while [eq. (8)] includes both the interaction factor and the dummy
itself.
In Table 12, models (1) and (3) present the estimations of [eq. (7)] while model
models (2) and (4) show the estimation of [eq. (8)] for the new combined sample. We
only report "rule of law" as control variable since none of them add any significant
information to this test. It appears that, between 1988 and 1998, the negative relation
between the acquiror's CARs and the target's CARs in cross-borders acquisitions is
significantly different from the relation between the acquiror and the target gain in the
other type of transaction7; in all the four models the coefficients of the target's CARs, the
interaction factor and the dummy variable are significant.
In summary, our sample suggested that, for the cross-market acquisitions oriented
by "control" and completed between 1988 and 2008, the cumulative abnormal returns of
the targets are negatively related to the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirors.
This result confirms our conclusions from the previous section. In a DM-EM the
7 This results still hold when we revert the dummy variable; dummy = 0 if cross-market acquisitions and 1
otherwise.
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developed market acquiror gains while the emerging market target loses. On the other
hand, in an EM-DM transaction, the developed market target gains while the emerging
market acquiror loses. We hypothesize that developed market firms embodies a
bargaining power that helps them in dragging the maximum profit from their transactions
with emerging market firms.
Before we conclude, we follow Chari et al. (2010) and replicate their hypothesis
on the transfer of governance. By doing so we (1) confirm that our samples exhibit the
same characteristics as theirs; (2) verify whether or not the bargaining power hypothesis
comes in addition to the transfer of governance, [eq. (8)] tests the transfer governance
hypothesis:
ACAR = a + ß^Institutional variable) (8)
where ACAR is the acquiror's cumulative abnormal return for (-1, +1).
Institutional variable is the asymmetries in "rule of law", "efficiency of judiciary
system", "corruption", "risk of expropriation" and "risk of contract repudiation". Note
that each institutional variable is tested separately.
Table 13 exhibits the estimation of [eq. (8)]. Models (1) - (3) provide evidence
that the greater the distance between the institutional quality of the acquiror and the target
nations, the greater the acquiror returns; the estimated coefficients of "rule of law",
"efficiency ofjudiciary system" and "corruption" are positive and significant.
We conclude that yes, there is a transfer of governance in DM-EM transactions.
This transfer results in a significant combined return of 1.51% on the announcement date;
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the acquiror and the target earn respectively 1.25% and 6.26% for the 3-day period
centered on the announcement day. When compared to other equivalent transactions, it
appears that the acquiror's gain generated by DM-EM deals is significantly higher than
the one generated by a DM-DM or an EM-EM transaction for example. Conversely, the
target's gain in DM-EM, even if still positive and significant, is lower than the one
generated by an EM-EM transaction for example. In sum, when a developed market
acquiror buys an emerging market target, there is a transfer of governance which results
in a positive gain for both the target and the acquiror. However, this gain is offset by a
hypothesized bargaining power of the developed market acquiror. The sample indicates
that part of the acquiror's gain comes from the target.
6. Conclusion
The number and value of cross-border mergers has grown steadily and at last
count appears to greatly exceed the comparable numbers for purely U.S. mergers. They
also constitute an increasing fraction of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in emerging
markets. Whereas prior research has focus on the role of governance in the transfer and
addition of value to acquirors, we examine the impact of cross-border mergers in
emerging and developed markets on shareholders wealth between 1988 and 2008. Our
inclusion of target and combined returns along with acquiror returns allow us to present a
more complete picture than that provided by prior studies.
Our results confirm that developed market acquirors gain on average 1.56% more
when they acquire emerging market targets as compared to when they acquire targets in
developed markets.
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However, we also find that emerging market targets' shareholder values are not
maximized when acquired by developed market acquirors which contradicts the value
creation hypothesis. Furthermore, we observe that no matter the acquiror's origin,
developed market targets experience a greater average CAR than emerging market
targets. For example, targets in the EM-DM sample make 14.29% more than targets in
the EM-EM sample. Even when considering cross-markets mergers, targets in the EM-
DM sample make 15.57% more than targets in the DM-EM sample.
We then conjecture that at least a part of the positive acquiror returns cannot be
attributed to the transfer of superior governance practices or intangibles as suggested by
Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010). Our results indicate that the sophistication level of the
acquiror and the target as well as their relative bargaining ability are important
determinants of the sharing of gains.
It is worth mentioning that the major issue encountered while performing this
study was the small sample sizes. Since mergers and acquisitions is a pretty new
phenomenon in emerging markets, there are few emerging market firms that are involved
in significant mergers and acquisitions. Also, most of the biggest companies in emerging
markets belong to the government and are sometimes privately held. Those two factors
together limit the number of transactions and the availability of data for such studies.
Except from the above mentioned limitations, our results raise interesting
questions. One of them - that we will leave open for further research - determining which
portion of the emerging market target's wealth goes to the developed market acquiror in
compensation of the transfer of governance. This could also be done by estimating the
27
proportion of the target's wealth that is loss due to weak bargaining abilities in order to
f
make better investment decisions in the future.
References
Andrade, G., M. Mitchell, and E. Stafford, 2001, New evidence and perspectives on
mergers, Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 15, 103-120.
Betton, S., and B. E. Eckbo, 2000, Toeholds, bid jumps, and expected payoffs in
takeovers, Review ofFinancial Studies 13, 841.
Black, B. S., 2000, The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last US
Wave), University ofMiami Law Review 54, 799.
Bouwman, C. H. S., K. Fuller, and A. S. Nain, 2009, Market valuation and acquisition
quality: Empirical evidence, Review ofFinancial Studies 22, 633.
Bris, ?., and C. Cabolis, 2008, The value of investor protection: Firm evidence from
cross-border mergers, Review ofFinancial Studies 21, 605.
Brown, S. J., and J. B. Warner, 1985, Using daily stock returns, Journal of Financial
Economics 14, 3-31.
Chari, A., P. P. Ouimet, and L. L. Tesar, 2010, The value of control in emerging markets,
Review ofFinancial Studies 23, 1741.
Dong, M., D. Hirshleifer, S. Richardson, and S. H. Teoh, 2006, Does investor
misvaluation drive the takeover market? The Journal ofFinance 61, 725-762.
Evenett, S. J., 2003, The cross border mergers and acquisitions wave of the late 1990s,
NBER Working Paper .
29
Fuller, K., J. Netter, and M. Stegemoller, 2002, What do returns to acquiring firms tell
us? Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions, The Journal of Finance 57,
1763-1793.
Holmstrom, B., and S. N. Kaplan, 2001, Corporate governance and merger activity in the
United States: making sense of the 1980s and 1990s, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 15, 121-144.
Jarrell, G. A., J. A. Brickley, and J. M. Netter, 1988, The market for corporate control:
the empirical evidence since 1980, The Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 2, 49-68.
Jensen, M. C, and R. S. Ruback, 1983, The market for corporate control: The scientific
evidence, Journal ofFinancial Economics 11, 5-50.
Kiymaz, H., and T. K. Mukherjee, 2000, The impact of country diversification on wealth
effects in cross-border mergers, Financial Review 35, 37-58.
Kuipers, D. R., D. P. Miller, and A. Patel, 2009, The legal environment and corporate
valuation: Evidence from cross-border takeovers, International Review ofEconomics
& Finance 18, 552-567.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1998, Law and finance,
Journal ofpolitical Economy 106, 1 113-1155.
Lowinski, F., D. Schiereck, and T. W. Thomas, 2004, The Effect of Cross-Border
Acquisitions on Shareholder Wealth—Evidence from Switzerland, Review of
Quantitative Finance and Accounting 22, 315-330.
30
Moeller, S. B., F. P. Schlingemann, and R. M. Stulz, 2005, Wealth destruction on a
massive scale? A study of acquiring-firm returns in the recent merger wave, The
Journal ofFinance 60, 757-782.
Schwert, G. W., 1996, Mark-Up Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal ofFinancial
Economics 41, 153-192.
Starks, L., and K. Wei, 2004, Cross-border mergers and differences in corporate governance,
University of Texas at Austin Working Paper.
31
Table 1: Sample Selection
Table 1 summarizes all the manipulations made on the initial sample of 637 514 mergers
and acquisitions collected on SDC from January 1st, 1988 to December 31st, 2008. For
each operation, it provides the reason why the deletion has been made, the number of
deals deleted, the percentage of the previous sample size represented by the deleted
transactions, and the new sample size. The final sample obtained is divided into the four
subsamples of interest. DM-DM, DM-EM, EM-EM and EM-DM have respectively 6729,
208, 405 and 93 transactions. Finally, DM-DM has been restricted to the 223 deals where
the acquiror has made, at least once between 1988 and 2008, an acquisition in an
emerging market.
Number of deals % of the












Non-Public Acquirors r -, 1 9366 1
Non-Public Targets 133291
Financial & Utilities 4054










Table 2: Sample Structure by Country
Table 2 presents the structure of the analyzed samples by country. Panel A provides the number of acquirors (targets)
per country between 1988 and 2008 for the DM-DM sample. Panel A also provides the percentage of the total number
of acquirors (targets) in the sample represented by each country. Panel B, Panel C and Panel D present the same








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Sample Structure by year
Table 3 presents the structure of the analyzed samples by year. Panel A provides the number of mergers and
acquisitions transactions in each year between 1988 and 2008 for the DM-DM sample. Panel A also provides the
percentage of the total number of transactions in DM-DM represented by each year. Panel A, Panel B, Panel C, and






















































































































Total 223 100 Total 208 100
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Table 6: Market Benchmarks
For each country that is a developed market, Table 6, Panel A provides the index used to
proxy the stock market activity along with its ticker. Panel B provides the same
information for emerging market countries. For each country we have selected the
broadest market-capitalization-weighted index - or the free-float-market capitalization
index - available. To be kept, any given index have to be calculated in local currency
and have daily opening and closing prices - adjusted to reflect capital changes like spin-
offs, stock splits and/or consolidations, stock dividends and/or bonus and rights offerings
and/or entitlement - recorded on Bloomberg from January 1st 1987 to December 31s
2009. Finally, for emerging and frontier markets, we required the index to include a
portion of the most actively traded stocks in the specific country.
Panel A: Developed Markets






















Austrian Traded ATX Index
Bel 20 Index
S&P/TSX Composite Index
OMX Helsinki 25 Index
CAC-40 Index
DAX Index


































Panel B: Emerging Markets





























Argentina Merval Index MERVAL
Brazil Bovespa Index IBOV
Chile Stock Market General Index IGPA
CSI 300 Index SHSZ300
Colombia Colcap Index COLCAP
Prague Stock Exchange Index PX
EGX 30 Index CASE
Ghana All Share GGSEGSE
Budapest Stock Exchange BUX
BSE SENSEX 30 Index SENSEX
Jakarta composite index JCI
Tel Aviv 25 Index TA-25
Kuwait SE Weighted Index SECTMIND
FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI FBMKLCI
Mexico Bolsa Index MEXBOLD
Peru Lima General Index IGBVL
PSEI - Philippine SE INDEX PCOMP
WSE WIG 20 Index WIG20
QE Index DSM
Bucharest BET Index BET
MICEX INDEX INDEXCF
LJSE Composite Index SVSM
FTSE/JSE Africa all shares JALSH
KOSPI Index KOSPI
Taiwan TAIEX Index TWSE
Stock Exchange of Thai Index SET
ISE NATIONAL 1 00 Index XUl 00
DFM General Index DFMGI
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Table 7: Acquirors and Targets Returns - Market Model
Table 7 Panel A summarizes the cumulative average stock market reactions to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions
transactions in the DM-DM sample. The market reactions are reported for the 21 -day, 11 -day, 5-day, 3-day periods centered on the
announcement day. We also reported reactions on the announcement day and the day right after. Panel A provides the CARs in local
currency one side and in USd on the other side. For each event window, Panel A provides the mean and the median of the cumulative
abnormal returns for both the acquiror and the target - and the combined CARs for USD. P-values of the mean and the median are
shown in parentheses. CARs are calculated using the market model. Panel B, Panel C and Panel D present the same information for













Median -0.15% 23.08%*** -0.32%
(0.65) (0.0001) (0.45)
(-5,+5) Mean -0.32% 25.79%***
(0.55) (0.0001)




Median -0.21% 23.45%*** -0.62%
(0.76) (0.0001) (0.45)
(-2,+2) Mean -0.03% 24.71%***
(0.95) (0.0001)
































































Median -0.50% 3.91%*** -0.38%
(0.76) (0.001) (0.7)
(-5,+5) Mean 2.05%** 10.94%***
(0.05) (<0.0001)




Median 0.27% 5.64%*** 2.83%
(0.19) (O.0001) (0.63)
(-2,+2) Mean 1.36%** 9.73%***
(0.02) (0.0001)




Median 3.91%* 3.57%*** 0.16%
(0.05) (0.0001) (0.8)
(-1+1) Mean 1.25%** 8.57%***
(0.02) (0.0004)




Median 0.72%** 3.84%*** 0.28%
(0.02) (0.0001) (0.36)
(0,0) Mean 0.57%*** 3.36%***
(0.0097) (0.002)




Median 0.059%* 0.93%*** 0.70%***
(0.08) (0.01) (0.0068)
(0,+l) Mean 1.15%** 7.95%***
(0.03) (0.0007)










Acquiror Target Acquiror Target Combined
(-10,+1O) Mean 0.56% 5.96%***
(0.53) (0.0009)




Median -1.50% 4.07%*** -0.43%
(0.39) (0.0012) (0.73)
(-5,+5) Mean 1.90%** 6.67%***
(0.02) (<0.0001)




Median 0.23% 4.86%*** 0.89%
(0.28) (O.0001) (0.36)
(-2,+2) Mean 1.86%*** 4.75%***
(0.0048) (0.0002)




Median 0.46%** 2.13%*** 1.05%
(0.04) (<0.0001) (0.15)
(-1+1) Mean 1.73%*** 4.76%***
(0.005) (O.0001)




Median 0.29%** 2.08%*** 0.77%**
(0.0169) (<0.0001) (0.02)
(0,0) Mean 1.69%** 2.55%***
(0.0$) (0.001)




Median 0.48%* 1.42%*** 1.27%
(0.09) (0.0002) (0.12)
(0,+l) Mean 1.38%** 3.67%***
(0.02) (0.0005)



















Median -2.22% 25.63% 29.72%***
(0.15) (O.0001) (O.0001)
(-5,+5) Mean -0.79% 16132%***
(0.45) (0.0002)






Median -1.34% 11.05%*** 27.33%***
(0.29) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
(-2,+2) Mean -0.79% 16.58%***
(0.29) (<0.0001)




Median -0.33% 9.78%*** 18.53%***
(0.41) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
(-1+1) Mean -0.77% 17.85%***
(0.23) (O.0001)














Median -0.65% 7.04%*** 10.37%***
(0.26) (O.0001) (0.001)
(0,+l) Mean -0.86% 16.70%***
(0.11) (<0.0001)




Median -1.08%* 9.28%*** 10.71%***
(0.07) (O.0001) (O.0001)
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Table 8: Acquirors Returns, Targets Returns and Joint Returns- MAR
Table 8 Panel A summarizes the cumulative average stock market reactions to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions
transactions in the DM-DM sample. The market reactions are reported for the 21-day, 1 1-day, 5-day, 3-day periods centered on the
announcement day. We also reported reactions on the announcement day and the day right after. Panel A provides the CARs in local
currency one side and in USD on the other side. For each event window, Panel A provides the mean and the median of the cumulative
abnormal returns for both the acquiror and the target - and the combined CARs for USD. P-values of the mean and the median are
shown in parentheses. CARs are calculated using the market adjusted returns. Panel B, Panel C and Panel D present the same
information for DM-EM", EM-EM and EM-DM samples respectively. *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%,


























(-5,+5) Mean -0.03% 26.55%***
(0.95) (<0.0001)








(-2,+2) Mean 0.06% 25.10%***
(0.88) (<0.0001)




Median -0.22% 20.53%*** 2.94%***
(0.66) (0.0001) (<0.0001)
(-1+1) Mean -0.23% 23.94%***
(0.53) (<0.0001)




Median -0.28% 20.40%*** 2.37%***
(0.17) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
(0,0) Mean -0.14% 20.53%***
(0.61) (<0.0001)




Median -0.33%* 17.20%*** 1.37%***
(0.058) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
(0,+l) Mean -0.17% 22.86%***
(0.60) (<0.0001)


















Median · 0.04% 5.94%***
(0.20) (O.0001)
Median 0.02% 5.44%*** 2.87%**
(0.21) (0.0001) (0.02)
(-5,+5) Mean 2.62%** 10.84%***
(0.012) (O.0001)




Median 0.87%** 4.98%*** 2.22%**
(0.02) (O.0001) (0.02)
(-2,+2) Mean 1.52%** 9.82%***
(0.011) (<0.0001)




Median 0.55%** 3.29%*** 1.58%**
(0.03) (<0.0001) (0.02)
(-1+1) Mean 1.30%** 8.72%***
(0.02) (0.0002)




Median 0.61%** 4.02%*** 1.15%***
(0.018) (<0.0001) (0.0055)
(0,0) Mean 0.66%*** 3.43%***
(0.003) (0.0013)




Median 0.18%** 1.39%*** 1.36%***
(0.04) (0.0064) (0.0008)
(0,+l) Mean 1.28%** 7.93%***
(0.017) (0.0005)




















Median -0.78% 6.35%*** 0.54%
(0.80) (O.0001) (0.31)
(-5,+5) Mean 2.47%*** 7.36%***
(0.002) (<0.0001)




Median 0.58%** 5.35%*** 1.54%*
(0.04) (0.0001) (0.06)
(-2,+2) Mean 2.06%*** 5.13%***
(0.001) (<0.0001)




Median 0.43%*** 2.56%*** 1.36%*
(0.007) (<0.0001) (0.08)
(-1+1) Mean 1.84%*** 5.10%***
(0.0025) (<0.0001)




Median 0.24%*** 2.77%*** 0.98%**
(0.0043) (<0.0001) (0.006)
(0,0) Mean 1.77%** 2.64%***
(0.03) (0.0008)




Median 0.39%** 1.46%*** 0.86%
(0.03) (0.0001) (0.17)
(0,+l) Mean 1.49%** 3.86%***
(0.011) (0.0003)




















Median 0.12% 26.37%*** 4.54%***
(0.96) (<0.0001) (0.006)
(-5,+5) Mean -0.24% 17.61%***
(0.80) (O.0001)




Median 0.34% 11.95%*** 4.11%***
(0.99) (<0.0001) (0.0004)
(-2,+2) Mean -0.29% 17.05%***
(0.68) (O.0001)








(-1+1) Mean -0.36% 18.05%***
(0.59) (<0.0001)




Median 0.01% 9.43%*** 4.10%***
(0.92) (O.0001) (0.0014)
(0,0) Mean -0.29% 12.76%***
(0.55) (<0.0001)




Median -0.16% 7.55%* 2.40%*
(0.95) (<0.0001) (0.0082)
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Table 10: Relation between Acquiror and Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Table 10 shows regression estimates of the acquiror cumulative abnormal return on the target cumulative abnormal return in each of
our four samples. In column (1) the dependant variable is the acquiror CAR for (-1, +1) and the explanatory variable is the target
CAR for the same window. Columns (2) - (6) control for the asymmetries in institutional settings between the acquiror's nation and
the target's nation. All the institutional variables are described in Appendix A. Panel A, B, C and D presents the estimates for DM-
DM, DM-EM, EM-EM and EM-DM respectively. Absolute value of t-statistics is shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **
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Table 11: Relation between Acquiror and Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns:
Robustness Test
Table 1 1 shows regression estimates of the acquiror cumulative abnormal return on the target cumulative abnormal return. Panel A
presents the estimates for DM-DM and EM-EM combined while Panel B presents the estimates for DM-EM and EM-DM combined.
In column (1) the dependant variable is the acquiror CAR for (-1, +1) and the explanatory variable is the target CAR for the same
window. Columns (2) - (6) control for the asymmetries in institutional settings between the acquiror's nation and the target's nation.
All the institutional variables are described in Appendix A. Absolute value of t-statistics is shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Panel A: "Same Market" Mergers and Acquisitions
(D (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TCAR4 0.037 0.041 0.045 0.042 0.041 0.042
(1.82)* (1.98)** (2.14)** (2,04)** (2.00)** (2.06)**
Rule of Law 0.009
(0.97)




Risk of Expropriation 0.018
(0.64)
Risk of Repudiation Contract 0.025
(1.54)
Constant -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
(0.99) (1.22) (1.32) (1.39) (1.34) (1.54)
Observations 151 145 145 145 145 145
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Panel B: Cross markets mergers and acquisitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TCAR4 -0.069 -0.073 -0.07 . -0.072 -0.072 -0.076
(2.32)** (2.16)** (2.04)** (2.07)** (2.15)** (2.27)**
Rule of Uw -0.001
(0.36)




Risk of Expropriation -0.001
(0.30)
Risk of Repudiation Contract -0.002
(0.61)
Constant 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015
(1.99)* (1.84)* -1.67 (1.73)* (1.80)* (1.93)*
Observations 60 56 56 56 56 56
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
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Table 12: Relation between Acquiror and Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns:
Difference between "Domestic" and "Cross-Market" Takeovers
Table 12 shows regression estimates of the acquiror cumulative abnormal return on the target
cumulative abnormal return and highlights the difference between "domestic" takeovers (DM-
DM and EM-EM) and "cross-market" (DM-EM and EM-DM) takeovers. The dependant variable
is the acquiror CAR for (-1, +1). The explanatory variables are the target CAR for (-1, +1);
dummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the takeover is "cross-market" and 0 otherwise;
TCAR/dummy is the interaction between TCAR4 dummy; Rule of Law is the distance between
acquiror's rule of law score and the target's rule of law score. Absolute value of t-statistics is
shown in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
ACAR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TCAR 0.022 0.037 0.03 0.04
(1.20) (1.88)* (1.38) (2.07)**
TCAR*dummy -0.058 -0.18 -0.053 -0.11
(1.89)* (2.77)*** (1.70)* (2.72)***
dummy 0.018** 0.02
(2.06) (2.17)**
Rule of Law 0.0007 -0.0003
(0.49) (0.17)
Constant 0.0006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.007
(0.15) (1.02) (0.33) (1.44)
Observations 211 211 201 201
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
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Table 13: Transfer of Governance Hypothesis Test
Table 13 shows regression estimates for acquiror cumulative abnormal return and on proxies for
asymmetries in institutional settings between acquiror and target nation. The dependant variable
is the acquiror cumulative abnormal returns for the 3-day period centered on the announcement
date. All the explanatory variables are described in Appendix A. Absolute value of t-statistics is
shown in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rule of Law 0.004
(1.84)*





Risk of Expropriation 0.003
(0.71)
Risk of Contract 0.005
(1.25)
Constant 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.59) (0.49) (0.42) (0.58) (0.55)
Observations 201 201 201 201 201
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 0.01
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APPENDIX A: Variable definitions and sources
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Measure ofvalue creation
ACARI Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiror stock over a 21 -day event window
centered on the announcement day; CAR (-10,+1O)
ACAR2 Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiror stock over a 11 -day event window
centered on the announcement day; CAR (-5,+5)
ACAR3 Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiror stock over a 5-day event window centered
on the announcement day; CAR (-2,+2)
ACAR4 Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiror stock over a 3-day event window centered
on the announcement day; CAR (-1,+I)
ACAR5 Abnormal return of the acquiror stock on the announcement day ( day 0 )
ACAR6 Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiror stock over a two-day event window
centered on the announcement day ; CAR (0, +1)
TCARl Cumulative abnormal return of the target stock over a 21 -day event window centered
on the announcement day; CAR (-10,+1O)
TCAR2 Cumulative abnormal return of the target stock over a 1 1-day event window starting 5
centered on the announcement day; CAR (-5,+5)
TCAR3 Cumulative abnormal return of the target stock over a 5 -day event window centered
on the announcement day; CAR (-2,+2)
TCAR4 Cumulative abnormal return of the target stock over a 3-day event window centered
on the announcement day; CAR (-1,+I)
TCAR5 Abnormal return of the target stock on the announcement day ( day 0 )
TCAR6 Cumulative abnormal return of the target stock over a two-day event window starting




Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country-
risk ratingagency International Country Risk (ICR). Average of the months of
April and October of themonthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to
10, with lower scores for lesstradition for law and order. Sources: International
Country Risk Guides and La Porta et al. (1998)
ICR's assessment of the corruption in government. Lower scores indicate "high
government officials are likely to demand special payments" and "illegal
payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government" in the
form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax
assessment, policy protection, or loans". Average of the months of April and
October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with
lower scores for higher levels of corruption. Sources: International Country Risk
Guides and La Porta et al. (1998)
Assessment of the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects
business, particularly foreign firms" produced by the country-risk rating agency
Business International Corporation. It "may be taken to represent investors'
assessments of conditions in the country in question". Average between 1980-
1983. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores lower efficiency levels. Sources: La
Porta et al. (1998)
Risk of "outright confiscation and forced nationalization" of property in the. This
variable ranges from 0 (high probability of expropriation) to 10 (low probability
of expropriation) and is calculated as the average from 1982 through 1997.
Sources: International Country Risk Guides and La Porta et al. (1998)
ICR's assessment of the "risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a
repudiation, postponement, or scaling down" due to "budget cutbacks,
indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in government
economic and social priorities." Average of the months of April and October of






















Market Value: Calculated by multiplying the total number of acquiror shares
outstanding times the acquiror's stock price 4 weeks prior to announcement date
($mil).
Total Assets: Total balance sheet assets including, current assets, long-term
investments and funds, net fixed assets, intangible assets, and deferred charges, as
of the date of the most current financial information prior to the announcement of
the transaction ($mil). TASS equals total liabilities plus shareholders' equity plus
minority interest.
Intangible Assets: Value of assets having no physical existence, yet having
substantial value to the firm, including goodwill, patents, trademarks, copyrights,
franchises, and costs in excess of net book value of businesses acquired, as of the
date of the most recent financial information prior to the announcement of the
transaction ($mil).
Cash and Marketable Securities: Cash and the temporary investment vehicles for
cash, including commercial paper and short-term government securities, as of the
date of the most current financial information prior to the announcement of the
transaction ($mil).
Total Liabilities: All debt and obligations owed to creditors, including all current
and long-term liabilities, as of the date of the most current financial information
prior to the announcement of the transaction (Smil). TLIA equals total assets
minus shareholders equity minus minority interest
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